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Abstract
I analyze the effect of an unexpected influx of immigrants on the price of skill and hence on the
earnings, human capital accumulation, and educational attainment of native workers. In order to study
these effects, I develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers who differ in their level
of skill and in their ability to learn new skills. These workers accumulate human capital optimally
using information about the current and future market price of skill to guide their decisions. To assess
the impact of immigration, I compare simulated earnings in the presence of immigration with a series
of counterfactual experiments. My findings suggest that immigration has a small negative direct effect
on earnings, but a positive and relatively large impact indirectly through human capital accumulation
and educational attainment. This latter mechanism explains 60% of the variations in earnings caused
by immigration.
1 Introduction
Immigration is a major source of growth in the U.S. labor market. Over the past two decades, Census
data show that decennial immigration to the U.S. grew to a peak of three percent. In 2000, more than ten
percent of the U.S. population was foreign born. Consequently, the main goal of the literature studying
immigration has been to analyze this influx of immigrants and its effect on native wages.
In this paper I analyze the impact of immigration on both native wages and the human capital
accumulation decision, using a general equilibrium model. Workers differ in their ability to accumulate
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human capital. They maximize their stream of earnings deciding optimally the amount of time to devote
to human capital accumulation taking as given current and future market prices. Educational attainment
is endogenous.
I analyze the effect of immigration at the national level, this aggregate approach extends the litera-
ture in a number of dimensions. First, using a general equilibrium model allows me to capture changes
in the behavior of natives after immigration alters the economic environment, and therefore it takes into
account the subsequent feedback effects on prices. The model allows to examine not only the impact of
immigration on earnings, but also its impact on human capital accumulation decisions and educational
attainment. This is of particular importance, because low skilled workers use their human capital accu-
mulation decisions to minimize the impact of immigration on their earnings. On the other hand, high
skilled workers can choose to accumulate additional human capital to increase the benefits from a higher
skill premium.
Second, the individuals in the model are heterogeneous in their ability to learn, have a raw labor
endowment and accumulate human capital endogenously. This raw labor and their accumulated human
capital are the productive factors in a non-linear production function. The non-linearity in the production
function is key to the analysis of the effects of immigration. The characteristics of immigrants differ from
natives along several dimensions. The average age and the shares of ability types in the immigrants and
native population differ. My approach allows me to study the impact on the economy after immigration
shocks to different ability and age groups. I use the overlapping generations (OLG) structure of the model
to distinguish between the effects of the immigration shocks on each skill and age group.
Third, I study the impact of immigration at the individual level. By shifting the focus away from
groups defined by their education and experience, I develop a better understanding of the dynamics both
within and between groups. Moreover, a well known fact from the wage inequality literature1 is that
within-group inequality plays an important role in the overall dynamics of the wage distribution.
Fourth, I add skill biased technical change (SBTC) to the analysis. This accounts for changes in labor
demand that affect the wage structure. In a general equilibrium context, Heckman et al. (1998) show
the infeasibility of using immigration alone as an explanation for the changes in U.S. wage inequality.
However, the mechanisms through which immigration and SBTC affect the economy are similar, and
1See for instance Autor et al. (2008).
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therefore disentangling these two effects is part of the challenge of this paper.
Finally, I undertake a more complete welfare analysis to study how immigration affects natives in their
life cycle. In order to do that, I calculate the variation on welfare, measured as the present discounted
value of lifetime earnings, for different types of individuals, classified by ability and age.
Using data from the March Current Population Surveys, the model is calibrated to match key features
of the U.S. age-earnings profile. The parameters associated with the ability to learn, the CES production
function, and the SBTC shocks are chosen to fit moments associated with the dispersion and evolution
of the earnings distribution.
Further, Census data is used to obtain the age and ability distribution of migrants. This information
allows counterfactual experiments to assess the impact of immigration. Comparing earnings in the pres-
ence of immigration with the counterfactual without immigration, I calculate the impact of immigration
on earnings and human capital accumulation.
I find that immigration has similar effects to those in previous nation-wide studies when I restrict
the analysis to the impact of immigration on the average log-earnings of education-experience groups2.
Endogenous human capital accumulation provides an alternative mechanism to mitigate and in some cases
amplify the direct effects of immigration on earnings. Workers re-optimize their human capital decisions
after immigration changes the relative price of human capital. Their actions mitigate the observed effect
at the education-experience group level. Thus, I conclude that immigration has a small direct effect on
earnings, but a relatively large impact on human capital accumulation and educational attainment.
Previous research finds conflicting evidence regarding the impact of immigration on the native labor
market. One set of studies focuses on clusters of immigrants in specific labor markets and finds small effects
of immigration on earnings. These studies quantify the impact of migration using variation provided by
differing levels of migrant inflow by local labor market.
Comparing local labor markets to study immigration was first introduced by Grossman (1982). Fol-
lowing Grossman’s work, Altonji and Card (1991), and LaLonde and Topel (1991) treat immigrants and
natives as two different inputs in the production function. However, there is a high degree of hetero-
geneity in the distribution of immigrants’ skills across cities. Therefore, aggregating immigrants in one
productive factor can potentially bias the estimation of the impact of immigration on natives’ wages. To
2Borjas (2003) analyzes immigration using similarly defined education-experience groups.
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circumvent this problem, Jaeger (1996) and Card (2001) assume perfect substitutability between natives
and immigrants within skill groups. Card (1990) uses the Mariel Boatlift as a natural experiment in the
Miami labor market to assess the impact of an unexpected inflow of foreign workers. The consensus of
these studies is that immigration has a very small impact on the wage structure.
However, workers are mobile across regions, and hence can migrate if labor conditions worsen through
immigration. Hence, as Borjas et al. (1992, 1996) and Borjas (1994) note, comparisons across local
labor markets can underestimate the effect of immigration. An economy-wide approach can circum-
vent the bias associated with internal migration, and therefore capture the impact of immigration on
education-experience groups. Using this approach, Borjas finds bigger and significant negative effects of
the immigration on native earnings.
There are few studies looking at immigration using a general equilibrium framework. Heckman et al.
(1998) focus on explaining the wage inequality increase in the 1980s. They find that immigration cannot be
the main explanation for the increase in wage dispersion. Storesletten (2003) examines the positive impact
of immigration on tax revenues and concludes that immigration can have a positive effect on the fiscal
budget. However, the present work differs from previous studies because my emphasis is on the interaction
between immigration, human capital accumulation, and the dynamics of the earning distribution.
This paper is also related to the literature studying the dynamics of wage inequality in the U.S. using
general equilibrium models. Heckman et al. (1998) extend the Ben-Porath framework adding heteroge-
neous agents and endogenous human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, the amount of heterogeneity is
limited to only four skill groups. I allow for 20 skill groups. Heathcote et al. (2010) study the macroe-
conomics effect of inequality. They introduce incomplete markets, and their model explains the main
features of the dynamics of the wage structure. Moreover, they use two types of skill and gender as
inputs in the production function, thus they analyze the intra-household decision of consumption and
education. They conclude that labor supply and human capital accumulation are used to insure against
shocks. Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) present a model with a high degree of heterogeneity which matches
the main features of the U.S. wage distribution. Here I extend the latter model using a CES production
function rather than a linear one. This extension allows assessment of the impact on the economy after
shocks to different skill groups, which is key to the analysis of the impact of immigration in light of the
high degree of skill heterogeneity across immigrants.
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2 Model
I develop a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and heterogeneous workers to capture
some key features of the dynamics of the U.S. earning distribution. These include the acceleration of
earnings inequality since 1980 and the dynamics of the college/high school premium. This model has
important advantages. It allows for endogenous human capital accumulation, a rich earnings distribution
and a production function that incorporates SBTC.
In the following subsections, I present the details of the model. However, because the main focus of
this work is to study how immigration affects human capital accumulation decisions and the earnings
profiles of individuals, the discussion about how this model can explain the evolution of inequality in the
U.S. is kept to a minimum.
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) show that the dynamics of U.S. wage inequality are mostly driven by
SBTC using a model with a linear production function. Here, I extend their model, assuming a non-linear
production function. The model is ideal to analyze immigration for two main reasons. First, it has a well
defined notion of the skill premium. This is crucial because immigration will necessarily change the skill
premium. Previous models emphasize either the skill price3 or the educational skill premium. However,
to capture the dynamics of wage inequality, both between- and within-educational groups, it is necessary
to identify the tradeoff between acquiring more human capital and the cost of doing so, when prices are
changing. In the case of a standard Ben-Porath model, a higher skill price produces benefits that are
offset by the cost of higher investment in human capital4. Studies using only educational skill premiums
cannot predict behavior within an educational group.
Second, this approach also allows for a high degree of heterogeneity across workers. This is crucial to
analyzing the impact of immigration on the earnings distribution given the heterogenous distribution of
age and human capital across immigrants. Moreover, I can calculate the effect of immigration both at the
individual level, and at specific age-ability groups. The high degree of heterogeneity across individuals is
consistent with microeconomic evidence showing a substantial increase in the dispersion of earnings over
the life cycle within a given cohort5.
3These studies are based on Ben-Porath (1967).
4The cost of accumulating human capital is forgone earnings.
5See for instance Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007) and Huggett et al. (2006).
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2.1 Consumers
In this economy, individuals are born into cohorts of the same size, each normalized to one. These cohorts
make up the overlapping generations that populate the economy.
Each individual enters the economy at the age of 18, with an initial level of human capital h0, and a
raw labor endowment ` which I normalize to one. Each period, individuals decide to use their one unit
of time to either rent their labor and human capital to the representative firm or to accumulate human
capital. The fraction of time dedicated to the latter activity is denoted by i.
Workers participate in the labor force until they reach 62 years of age6. This implies a maximum of
45 years in the labor force. After that, the worker does not receive earnings, and therefore retired workers
are not considered in the model economy.
The dynamics of human capital accumulation are
hja+1,t+1 = h
j
a,t +A
j(hja,t · ija,t)α (1)
where t corresponds to the time period, a is age of the individual, and j represents the type. Notice
that the source of heterogeneity in this economy is the parameter A, drawn from the distribution A.
According to the framework presented in Ben-Porath (1967) this parameter can be interpreted as the
ability to learn. The choice of this particular mechanism of human capital accumulation is standard for
these types of models7. Finally, α is the curvature of the Ben-Porath accumulation function.
I assume that the type j, or ability, is drawn from a uniform distribution. The details of how the
parameters associated with the ability distribution are calibrated is presented in Section 4. The uniform
distribution has two main advantages over other distributions. First, the distribution is characterized by
only two parameters, the mean and the variance. Second, the support of the distribution is finite and
bounded. Thus it is possible to exclude negative abilities to learn8.
At any point in time, a worker rents both his human capital hja,t and his raw labor endowment, net of
investment time, to the representative firm at prices PHt and P
L
t respectively. The decision to accumulate
human capital depends on the current and future prices of human capital and raw labor, as well as the
662 years of age is the earliest retirement age in the U.S.
7See for instance Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) and Heckman et al. (1998).
8I am exploring the sensibility of the results to this assumption. I intend to present alternatives in the future.
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individual’s ability to learn. Therefore hja,t differs by age and cohort, as well as by type. Workers’ earnings
are
yja,t = [P
H
t h
j
a,t + P
L
t `a,t](1− ija,t). (2)
If the fraction of time invested in human capital accumulation ija,t is equal to 1, I consider the individual
to be enrolled in tertiary education. If the fraction is in the interval [0, κ], κ < 1, the worker dedicates
only a fraction of his time to accumulating human capital and is considered to be engaged in on-the-job
learning9. There are two reasons for the discontinuity in the choice set of investment time. First, it
prevents workers from spending a very small, and unrealistic, amount of time at work. Second, it allows
me to express the lowest possible wage in terms of the parameters of the model10 11.
For simplicity, the model ignores tuition costs, and therefore the only costs associated with tertiary
education are forgone earnings.
It is important to notice that in this model there is a difference between observed and potential
earnings. The difference is associated with adjustments at the intensive margin, represented by the fraction
ija,t. These adjustments are a function of aggregate prices, technological change, and the individual’s
human capital stock. One of the most important implications of this difference is that the skill price and
observed earnings can move in opposite directions in a given period. This is because workers forecast
future prices and take advantage of the higher skill premium by increasing their investment time, and
consequently their observed earnings decrease temporarily while making the investment.
There is a macroeconomics literature examining capital-skill complementarities. Krusell et al. (2000)
show that the elasticity of substitution between capital and high skilled workers is lower than between
capital and low skilled workers. This implies that a fraction of SBTC is attributable to changes in the
aggregate quantities of capital in the economy. Violante (2002) focus on the improvement of the quality of
equipment, and how vintage-human capital can hinder the ability of workers to transfer skills across jobs,
which increases the wage inequality. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) examines how the introduction of
9This way to model human capital accumulation is standard in the literature. It is used by Heckman et al. (1998), and
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009).
10In this case the lowest wage in a given period corresponds to the wage of a 18 year old worker of the lowest ability type,
investing κ of his time in accumulating human capital.
11Card and DiNardo (2002) argue that changes in the minimum wage and other economic conditions play an important
role in the dynamics of wage inequality. It is possible to extend this model to account for changes in the minimum wage by
calibrating the parameter κ. This extension is not presented in this version.
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new technologies can appear in the data as low productivity due to the delay related to the acquisition of
the abilities to operate the new technology. Therefore, this apparent drop in productivity can alter the
wage distribution. However, the model presented here abstracts from these implications assuming that
workers acquire general skills, and that skill biased technological change, captures changes in the demand
associated with the processes described above.
In addition, I assume that workers are risk neutral and they can borrow and lend freely at a fixed
interest rate r, which implies that the discount factor β is equal to 1/(1 + r). Assuming no borrow-
ing constraints is consistent with the literature studying endogenous educational attainment. Cameron
and Taber (2004), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) show that borrowing
constraints are not empirically relevant for the educational attainment decision, mostly because income
affects this decision through channels related to the family12.
To summarize, a typical worker of ability type j, born into cohort t − a, solves the following maxi-
mization problem:
max
{ija,t}
45∑
a=1
βa[PHt h
j
a,t + P
L
t ](1− ija,t)
s.t.
ija,t ∈ [0, κ] ∪ {1}
hja+1,t+1 = h
j
a,t +A
j [hja,t · ija,t]α
2.2 Firms
One of the main differences between this model and previous models describing the U.S. wage structure is
the use of aggregate human capital Ht and aggregate raw labor Lt as productive factors. These production
factors were first introduced in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009). They have the advantage of allowing for
a high degree of heterogeneity across workers in an economy with an aggregate production function with
only two factors. Notice that the aggregate amounts used as productive factors are net of investment
12Family income is correlated with other aspects of the family that directly affect the ability to learn and the initial condition
of human capital. Borrowing constraint corresponds to a second order effect on the educational attainment decision.
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time, as is clear in the following expressions
Lt =
∑
a
∑
j
1 · (1− ija,t)
Ht =
∑
a
∑
j
hja,t · (1− ija,t)
The representative firm produces according to a CES production function, with a skill-neutral tech-
nological change parameter Zt and SBTC expressed using the parameters θ
H
t and θ
L
t . I normalize these
two parameters imposing that θHt + θ
L
t = 1 for all t. The firm solves the following maximization problem
max
Ht,Lt
Zt(θ
L
t (Lt)
ρ + θHt (Ht)
ρ)1/ρ − PHt Ht − PLt Lt. (3)
Notice that if ρ = 1, the CES production function collapses into a linear form, which is the case studied
in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009). In that particular case, the relative price of human capital with respect
to raw labor becomes independent of the aggregate quantities. Interestingly, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009)
show that a model with a linear production function fits most of the features of the dynamics of the U.S.
wage structure. However, studying the impact of waves of immigrants with heterogenous skills requires
that human capital and raw labor are not perfect substitutes. As a result, the immigrants’ composition
of skill is relevant when I evaluate the effect of immigration on natives’ earnings.
The firm’s first order condition is
PHt
PLt
=
(θHt
θLt
)(Ht
Lt
)ρ−1
. (4)
Equation (4) highlights the main differences between previous models looking at the U.S. wage struc-
ture and the approach presented here. Previous studies use college and non-college workers as productive
factors13. That is, they use wage data to calculate the college premium for the left hand side, and data
on the fraction of college educated workers in the labor force for the second term on the right hand
side of equation (4). Using this information they either estimate the sequence of SBTC, or, under some
regularity assumption about SBTC, they estimate the elasticity of substitution between college and non-
13See for instance Heckman et al. (1998) and Acemoglu (2002).
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college workers14. In contrast, here, the elasticity of substitution is between human capital and raw
labor. This elasticity is related to the returns from investing time in human capital accumulation, even
within-educational groups. Moreover, Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) show that even when using a linear
production function of human capital and raw labor, which implies perfect substitutability, there is an
implied imperfect elasticity of substitution between college and non-college workers that is finite and
similar to the elasticity estimated in previous papers. I confirm this finding15 in section 5.
As was discussed above, using human capital and raw labor as productive factors has several advan-
tages. However, these quantities are not observed directly in the data, complicating the calibration of
the model. In Section 4, I describe in detail the calibration procedure, but the strategy is to choose
parameters to best match various moments of the U.S. earnings distribution.
3 Data
The March Current Population Surveys (CPS) is the most suitable data set available for the calibration
procedure. The span of the data, from 1964 to 2005, is the longest among comparable surveys. This is
critical because the influx of foreign workers increased in size during the 1970s. Using data from years
prior to 1970 moderates the effect of immigration in the calibration procedure. Furthermore, the annual
frequency of the CPS data increases the precision of the calibration of parameters associated with the
dynamics of the earning distribution.
The sample is constructed following the work of Autor et al. (2008). I use the weekly earnings of full
time active male workers constructed by dividing annual earnings by the total number of weeks worked16.
In particular, the sample contains information on real weekly earnings for workers ages 18 to 62, who
participate in the labor force at least 40 weeks in the year, working at least 35 hours per week.
The March CPS lacks detailed information about country of birth17. Therefore, the Census is used
to obtain information about the immigration process. I use the Censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000 to
obtain information about both the distribution of age and the number of migrants. This data is used to
14For a discussion of these approaches see Acemoglu (2002).
15The intuition is that workers differ in their ability to accumulate human capital, and diminishing returns and opportunity
costs limit the incentive of a worker with a given ability to devote time to human capital accumulation.
16Note that the March CPS has information about annual earnings, hours worked per week and weeks worked. Thus, it
is possible to construct either hourly or weekly earnings. But, Autor et al. (2005) and Lemieux (2006) show that hourly
earnings are noisy, and they are not available prior the year 1976. For that reason, I construct weekly earnings.
17This information becomes available in 1994.
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construct the age and ability distribution of immigrants. Details about how I calibrate the immigrants’
ability distribution are presented in Appendix A, but the general procedure is to choose the composition of
the immigrants’ ability types to match the growth rate of several moments of the immigrants’ distribution
of earnings. In particular I calibrate the fraction of immigrants that belong to each specific ability type.
I obtain the distribution presented in the right panel of figure 1 for twenty ability types, which is
the number of ability types that I use throughout this paper. Card (2001) classifies immigrants into 6
occupational categories, ordered by the mean educational attainment of the workers belonging to that
category. He finds that the distribution across occupation is similar to the one presented in figure 1.
Finally, the left panel of figure 1 displays the age distribution of immigrants for the years 1980, 1990
and 2000. Note that the average age of the immigrants has been decreasing over time. Immigrants’ age
distribution plays an important role in the impact of immigration on the earning distribution, because
how workers adjust their human capital accumulation decision is associated with age, as it is discussed
in section 7.1. Finally, another consideration about the age of the immigrants is related to the fact that
younger immigrants arrive with lower educational attainment, but that does not necessarily implies that
they arrive with lower ability to accumulate new human capital, because they could have been migrated
before completing their optimal level of education.
4 Calibration of the Model
As was discussed in the previous section, human capital and raw labor are not observed directly in the
data. For that reason the calibration procedure needs to rely on matching various moments of the U.S.
earning distribution. The general idea is that given a set of parameters P0, I solve the model and simulate
a sequence of cross section distributions of earnings for the period 1964 to 2005. Using this simulated
data, I calculate a series of moments which I compare to moments from the March CPS. If the moments
from the simulated sample differ too much from the U.S. moments, the set of parameters is updated18 to
P1, and a new iteration begins.
In a similar way to that in the standard Ben-Porath framework, human capital accumulation decisions
depend on the SBTC process, current and future aggregate prices, the current level of human capital and
18Using the model, I can calculate how different parameters affect the earning distribution, and hence how to update the
parameters.
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the discount factor. Therefore, calibrating the parameters associated with the distribution of ability, the
elasticity of substitution between human capital and raw labor and the growth rate of the SBTC will
suffice to match the simulated age-earnings profile and human capital accumulation path to the dynamics
of the earnings distribution observed in the data19.
The low level of immigration observed in the 1960s, as is shown in Table 3, reduces the influence of
migration on the calibration of the parameters. In particular, parameters associated with the distribution
of ability and the elasticity of substitution are calibrated using data from 1964 to 1974. Moreover, the
growth rate of SBTC during the 1960s and 1970s was lower than in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore the
change in prices is relatively small at the beginning of the sample20, which helps to improve the accuracy
of the calibration.
The literature analyzing the dynamics of the wage structure finds that the growth rate of SBTC is
not constant over time21. The consensus is that SBTC moved faster during the 1980s and slowed down in
the second half of the next decade, although the growth rate was still faster than in the 1970s. Therefore,
instead of calibrating the time series of the parameter22 θHt , I calibrate the growth rate of
θHt
θLt
for the
periods 1964 to 1979, 1980 to 1994, and 1995 to 2005.
4.1 Adjusting the Log-Wage Process
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) argue that earnings in this model can be interpreted as the systematic, or
life cycle, component of a more realistic earnings process. More precisely, expressing earnings as
log(yˆja,t) = log(y
j
a,t) + η
j
a,t + 
j
a,t (5)
allows a decomposition of log-earnings log(yˆja,t) into a systematic component log(y
j
a,t), a transitory
shock ja,t and an auto-regressive shock η
j
a,t that captures the observed serial correlation of earnings. This
specification is similar to others used in this literature, and it captures the effect of idiosyncratic shocks in
the earnings process23. Assuming that the transitory component and the auto-regressive component are
19Remember that the discount factor is fixed at the 1/(1 + r).
20This is documented in papers studying the dynamics of the U.S. wage distribution. See for instance Katz and Murphy
(1992), and Autor et al. (2008).
21For a discussion of this finding see Acemoglu (2002).
22Remember that θLt = 1− θHt , therefore the time series of θHt is enough to characterize SBTC.
23See for instance Storesletten et al. (2001).
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stationary implies that the variance of earnings observed in the data differs from the variance of earnings
in the model, by only a constant. Furthermore, changes in the observed growth rate of the variance
correspond to changes in the systematic component, and thus are captured by the model. Summarizing,
after adjusting for a constant, the model captures movements in the level of the variance and its growth
rate.
In the case of the mean of the log-earnings distribution, if the expected value of the shocks is equal to
zero, the expected value of the observed log-earnings and the log-earnings from the model must coincide.
4.2 Calibration Procedure
Human capital accumulation paths differ across workers due to age and heterogeneity in the ability to
learn. Moreover, earnings-experience profiles depend on the evolution of wages and the dynamics of human
capital. Equation (2) indicates that potential earnings are affected by both movements in aggregate prices
and changes in time invested. Assuming that from 1964 to 1974, the growth rate of the ratio
θHt
θLT
was
constant implies that changes in aggregate prices can be decomposed into changes in the aggregate levels
of human capital and raw labor, and a linear time trend. The aggregate quantities only depend on
the initial conditions and workers’ human capital accumulation decisions. Therefore, the distribution of
ability directly affects the shape of the earnings-experience profiles.
The ability parameter Aj is drawn from a uniform distribution with mean E(A) and variance σ2(A).
Figures 2 and 3 display how the simulated earnings profiles of one typical cohort change with the mean
and the variance of the distribution of ability. The figures show the earnings-experience profile for 8 types
of workers24. Note that some of the profiles are shorter because high ability workers spend some of their
time in tertiary education, and therefore enter to the labor market later25. The left panel in both figures
shows a base case. The right panel in Figure 2 shows how an increase in the mean of the distribution of
ability affects the earning profiles. The right panel in Figure 3 displays the change in the earning profiles
following an increase in the variance of the distribution of ability.
Figures 2 and 3 show that changing the ability parameters affects both the dispersion and the shape
of the earning profiles for a specific cohort. In particular, the ability parameters change primarily the
slope of the earning profiles in the first 15 years of work experience. This is consistent with the literature
24The actual calibration uses 20 different types, equally spaced over the support of the distribution.
25There is no unemployment in this model, therefore experience is defined as age minus 18 minus years in college.
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studying earnings profiles, for instance Murphy and Welch (1990) find that wages grow by 54% in the
first 10 years in the labor market, the increase is just 18% in the next 15 years, and there is slight decline
of less than 5% in the subsequent 15 years. However, the dispersion in the profiles is affected throughout
the life cycle.
The average variance of the log-earnings profile is the moment chosen to match the dispersion of the
earnings profile. Using the March CPS, the average cross sectional variance in the period 1964-1974 is
0.349. However, Section 4.1 illustrates the need to adjust the level of the variance simulated in order
to match the one observed in the data. Guvenen (2009) calculates the variances associated with the
transitory and the auto-regressive components of the earnings process, and concludes that it is necessary
to subtract 0.135 from the observed variance, and thus the target for the simulated data is 0.214. Note
that Guvenen (2009) calculates the variance of these innovations in a model that allows heterogeneity in
the accumulation of human capital, which is consistent with the model presented in this paper.
The average growth rate of the median of the log-earnings distribution during the period 1964-1974 is
0.0157, which is the target used in the calibration. Note that as was discussed in Section 4.1, no further
adjustment is needed.
Equation (4) shows that the dynamics of the relative price of human capital are associated both with
SBTC and with changes in the ratio of the aggregate net quantities of human capital and raw labor. If
ρ is equal to one and SBTC grows at a constant rate, the skill premium moves linearly in the period
1964-1974. However, if ρ is different from one, the ratio of the aggregate levels of human capital and raw
labor affect the dynamics of the relative price of human capital. Furthermore, if ρ is far from one, changes
in the aggregate quantities have a stronger effect on the relative price of human capital, and therefore the
growth rate of the relative prices becomes less linear.
In order to capture the effects of the change in the aggregate quantities on the relative price, I calibrate
the simulated data to match the average growth of the interquartile range of earnings for the period 1964-
1974. If ρ is different from one, changes in the relative price of human capital are not linear, which affects
the dispersion of the distribution of earnings, and consequently the interquartile range. The target of
average growth of the interquartile range for the period 1964-1974 is 0.011.
The literature studying the dynamics of the U.S. wage distribution finds that SBTC plays an important
role in the dynamics of the U.S. wage inequality. The fast increase in the wage dispersion during the
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Table 1: Parameters from the Literature
Parameter Value
r interest rate 0.05
β time discount rate 1/(1 + r)
α curvature of human capital function 0.71
T years spent in the labor market 45
∆ log(Zt) growth rate of skill-neutral tech. change 1.5%
1980s, the simultaneous increase in the variance of wages within demographic and skill groups and other
key features of the evolution of the wage distribution are evidence of a fast increase in the demand for
more skilled workers26. In order to capture these features of the evolution of the wage distribution, the
growth rate of SBTC is calibrated to match moments of the log-earnings distribution for three different
time periods: From 1964 to 1979, from 1980 to 1994, and from 1995 to 2005. These periods coincide with
the empirical findings of various paper surveyed in Acemoglu (2002).
In order to capture the change in earnings dispersion, I calibrate the model to match the average
growth rate of the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentiles of the log-earnings distribution,
for the periods discussed above. This measure of dispersion captures the dynamics of the tails of the
distribution, and therefore captures the behavior of the high and low ability types.
Table 4.2 presents the parameters of the model that are taken from the literature. Assuming a
constant interest rate of 5% is standard in the literature. The value for the curvature of the human
capital accumulation function is consistent with previous studies. Most of the estimates for this curvature
are between 0.7 and 0.95. Notice that increasing the value of α leads to larger adjustments in human
capital accumulation decisions after changes in prices. Therefore, assuming a relatively low value of α
assures that the changes in human capital are not driven by the choice of this parameter.
Table 4.2 displays the calibrated parameters. Note that the pattern of the growth rate of SBTC
coincides with the pattern described in previous studies27. SBTC accelerated during the 1980s and
slowed down after 1995.
26Card and DiNardo (2002), and Lemieux (2006) present an alternative explanation associated with the decline in the real
minimum wage.
27See for instance Autor et al. (2008) and Acemoglu (2002).
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
E(A) average ability 0.0423
σ2(A) variance of ability 0.0005
ρ elasticity of substitution 0.3
Growth rate of SBTC by period
∆ log
(
θHt
θLt
)
from 1964 to 1979 0.00736
∆ log
(
θHt
θLt
)
from 1980 to 1994 0.00756
∆ log
(
θHt
θLt
)
from 1995 to 2005 0.00692
5 Model-Data Comparison
The last section described the calibration procedure. However, in order to accurately assess the impact
of immigration on the U.S. earnings distribution, the model needs to fit the dynamics of the earnings
distribution.
The literature studying the dynamics of the U.S. wage inequality has used the college premium as
a measure of between-group inequality. Note that educational attainment is endogenous in this model,
and therefore the calibration procedure cannot directly affect this measure of overall inequality. Figure 8
displays the evolution of the college premium calculated using the March CPS and the simulated data.
As was discussed in section 2 the elasticity of substitution between human capital and raw labor
differs from the implied elasticity of substitution between college28 and non-college educated workers.
In particular, I calculate the implied elasticity of substitution between college and non-college using the
standard specification29 in the literature:
log
(wct
wht
)
= a0 + a1t− 1
φ
log
(N ct
Nnt
)
+ t (6)
where wct corresponds to the average earnings of college educated workers at time t, N
c
t is the number of
28Note that in the simulated data, a worker is classified as college educated if she has been enrolled in tertiary education
for at least four years.
29See for instance Katz and Murphy (1992).
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those workers and wht and N
h
t correspond to the same quantities for the high school workers. Using the
March CPS data I obtain a elasticity of substitution between college and non-college workers of φ = 1.66.
The simulated data implies φ = 1.88. Note that this number differs from the calibrated elasticity of
substitution between human capital and raw labor, which is equal to 11−ρ = 1.42.
Figure 5 displays the evolution of the 90/10 log-earnings differential for the March CPS and for the
simulated data. Note that the graph shows the deviation from the initial value. As expected, the simulated
data trace the general movements of the observed 90/10 differential.
5.1 Fit to Within-Groups Dynamics
One of the advantages of using human capital and raw labor as inputs in the production function is that
the notion of skill premium is well defined. Moreover, educational attainment is endogenous in the model,
and considering the high degree of heterogeneity across workers, it is possible to study the movements of
the log-earning distribution within education-experience groups.
The literature studying the evolution of the U.S. wage inequality finds that residual30 inequality has
increase in the last 30 years (Autor et al. (2008)). The standard approach used to analyze the evolution
of the within-group inequality is to estimate the residuals of a specification that includes controls for
educational attainment, experience (or age), and other demographic characteristics like gender or race.
Here, I estimate the residual inequality from a regression of log-earnings on four educational dummies
interacted with a quartic function on experience31.
Standard models using college and non-college workers as inputs in the production function cannot
generate within-group inequality32. Figure 6 displays the evolution of the 90/10 residual differential for
the March CPS and for the simulated data. Note that the simulated data generates less within-group
dispersion than the actual data. However, the model captures some of the increase in the within-group
inequality in log earnings observed since 1975.
30The residual is the wage inequality unexplained after controlling for educational attainments and age or experience.
31This is the same specification used in Autor et al. (2008), and Katz and Murphy (1992).
32One alternative is to assume idiosyncratic shocks to generate the inequality within groups. But, in the present work the
within-group inequality is in the structure of the model and does not rely on any shock.
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5.2 Fit to Overall Dynamics
A more precise analysis of the dynamics of the U.S. wage inequality would need to account for changes
in the composition of the labor force, or equivalently, to separate the cohort effect from the temporal (or
price) effects. But, because this paper focuses on the impact of immigration on the earnings distribution,
I present evidence suggesting that the model generates enough variation across cohorts and within cohorts
to map the overall movements of the earnings distribution.
Figure 7 displays four panels with the changes in the log-earnings distribution by percentile for a
number of periods of time. For instance, in the top left panel, each point represents the difference between
a percentile of the log-earnings distribution in the year 2005 and its 1970 counterpart. Therefore, the
figure shows the change of the entire distribution of log-earnings over that period of time. The top right
panel displays the same exercise for the period 1970-1980, the bottom left panel uses the period 1980-1990
and the bottom right panel displays the period 1990-2005. Note that the simulated data captures the
key trends for the different periods. For instance, the increase of the upper tail of the distribution in the
period 1990-2005, or the change in the average growth rate between the 1970s and the 1980s.
6 Modeling Immigration
Immigration that occurred during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s differs both in the age distribution of the
immigrants, and in the relative size of the inflows. According to Census data, the number of immigrants
arriving to the U.S. in the decade leading up the Census33 corresponds to 6% of the U.S. population in
1980, 4% in 1990, and 4.5% in the 2000 Census34. For that reason, I explore the effect of each individual
wave, as well as the overall effect when all the waves of immigrants are introduced. Table 3 displays the
inflow and the stock of immigrants with respect to the U.S. population. Note that the inflow per decade
has increased since the 1950s, and since the 1970s the inflow is bigger than the outflow, causing the stock
of immigrants to increase over time.
In order to identify the effect of immigration on earnings and human capital accumulation, I assume
that the influx of immigrants is unexpected and immigrants only arrive in the years 1980, 1990 and 2000.
33For the 1980 Census, I consider immigrants arriving at any time before 1980, and not only in the previous decade. About
a half of them arrived between 1979 and 1980.
34These percentages are with respect to the sample of full time male workers.
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The reason for this assumption is that in a general equilibrium approach with perfect foresight about prices
and inflow of immigrants, immigration would have no observable effect on prices, because workers will
take current and future immigration into account when making their optimal decisions, and consequently
they adjust their optimal human capital accumulation decision prior the influx of immigrants. Thus,
this assumption allows me to isolate the direct effects of immigration from the subsequent changes in the
economy observed in the period between each wave of immigrants.
In appendix D, I present results when immigrants arrive yearly. In this case, assuming immigration as
an unexpected process is not realistic. Therefore, I present the results when natives use past immigration
as proxy for future immigrations, and when natives use a more sophisticated bayesian update, to forecast
the trend on the influx of immigrants. Naturally, the results are quantitatively smaller due to the smaller
deviation from the optimal pre-immigration human capital accumulation plan, but are qualitatively the
same.
As was discussed previously, immigration changes the relative prices of skills and that affects the
optimal decisions of the individuals populating the economy. In order to disentangle the direct effect on
prices and the feedback effect from the re-optimization process, I present a counterfactual experiment, in
which immigrants arrive and join the labor market, but natives are not allowed to change their optimal
decisions35. Note that in this case natives decisions are not consistent with the aggregate prices. This
restricted counterfactual captures the effect of immigration through aggregate prices, while shutting down
the feedback effect from the changes in the optimal decisions of natives.
7 Results
In this section, I examine the effects of immigration on earnings distribution and human capital accumu-
lation decisions using a number of different approaches.
First, I examine the effect at the individual level. I compare the earnings of a counterfactual economy
without immigration with the earnings of an economy in the presence of immigration. Moreover, I compare
changes in the human capital accumulation decision and decompose the effect of immigration into its effect
on aggregate variables and on individual variables.
35For this experiment I make the somewhat unrealistic assumption that younger workers, born after immigration has
affected the economy, follow the human capital accumulation decision associated with an economy without immigration.
This allows me to compare the different counterfactual experiments for all ages.
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Second, I detail a present discounted value analysis of the effect of immigration. This analysis high-
lights the heterogeneity of the effect of immigration across age and ability types. I also show the present
discounted value analysis for different age and educational attainment groups. Moreover, using the present
discounted value of the restricted counterfactual economy, I calculate the benefits of allowing workers to
re-optimize their human capital accumulation decisions.
Finally, I revisit the results from empirical approaches, and I present evidence suggesting that the
mechanism of adjusting human capital accumulation decision is consistent with results presented in the
three papers using empirical methodologies to assess the impact of immigration.
7.1 Counterfactual Experiments
As was discussed in previous sections, immigration affects the relative price of human capital and raw
labor. However, the change in the skill premium, defined as
PHt
PLt
, is small. Table 4 presents the average
percentage change in the skill premium for different periods of time and for the different experiments.
Note that, individual waves can only produce less than 1% variation. When the size of the cumulative
influx of immigrants reaches around 10% (adding the size of the 1980 and 1990 immigration flows), the
change in the skill premium reaches 2%.
The SBTC plays an important role. The 1990 wave of immigration is only 70% of the size of that
in 1980, but the effect of the 1990 wave on the skill premium, measured over the decade following 1990,
was more than 80% the size of the change in skill premium associated with the wave in 1980. The main
difference between these two experiments is that in 1990 SBTC was at the peak of its acceleration, while in
1980 SBTC was just starting to accelerate. The intuition for this difference is that when the technology is
more skill biased, for instance after ten years of high rates of growth in SBTC, changes in the composition
of the labor force induce larger changes in the skill premium. This is because, if relative human capital
becomes more scarce, each unit is relatively more productive, and therefore the skill premium increases
by more.
The restricted counterfactual produces qualitatively similar results. However, the change in the skill
premium is smaller because workers cannot re-optimize their decision . At first this may seem counterin-
tuitive. Consider, however, that when workers face higher skill prices most of them will decide to increase
their investment in human capital, temporarily reducing the actual amount of aggregate human capital
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available for production but thereafter further increasing the supply of human capital. Note that this
effect is equivalent to the lag between SBTC and changes in observed earnings discussed in Heckman
et al. (1998) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009).
7.2 Effects by Ability Type
Using counterfactual experiments, I investigate the effect of immigration by ability type. Moreover, I
present results for different cohorts, thus it is possible to study how the effect of immigration changes
across age and ability.
Workers use the fraction of time invested in accumulating human capital to mitigate, or in some
cases augment, the changes in the skill premium. For instance, a worker with a low ability to learn, and
consequently a relatively low level of human capital, would observe a decrease in her relative earnings
after a increase in the skill premium. She faces the following tradeoff. She may increase the time invested
in accumulating human capital leading to higher future earnings. However, with the new prices, each
fraction of time used in the accumulation of human capital is now more costly. Considering that she has
low ability to learn, her decision would be to decrease the amount of time dedicated to accumulating
human capital and therefore closing the gap between observed and potential earnings, and attenuating
the negative effect of the drop in her relative earnings.
Conversely, a worker with high ability to learn facing the same tradeoff would be better off investing
more time in accumulating human capital, and therefore magnifying her benefit from the small change in
the skill premium. Note that this effect is observable in the present discounted value because in the time
periods just after immigration results in new relative prices, a high ability worker would invest more time
accumulating human capital, and therefore observed earnings can potentially go down for a few periods.
Finally, very high ability workers, or workers that already have very high levels of human capital, may
decide not to increase their time invested in human capital accumulation, because for them it is more
costly to do so. In particular, using the immigrant arrivals of 1980 and 1990, the average change of the
present discounted value across all cohorts for workers with the second highest ability type is 3.1% higher
than for the highest ability type. But if I only consider the five youngest cohorts, I find the opposite, and
the highest ability worker benefits more than the second highest ability type by 2.1%. The intuition is
that younger cohorts can make a larger adjustment to their optimal decisions in response to changes in
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the skill premium, and there is less dispersion in their levels of accumulated human capital36.
Table 5 presents the percentage change in the present discounted value (PDV) for different ability
types and different cohorts. Note that the change is defined as the difference between the PDV associated
with an economy with immigration and the PDV associated with the economy without immigration. As
for previous results, I present this analysis for each individual wave of immigrant arrivals and for the sum
of consecutive waves.
Consistent with the intuition discussed before, low ability types suffer a decrease in their PDV. Older
cohorts are less exposed to the impact of immigration, and thus the loss in welfare is reduced.
Middle ability types exhibit interesting patterns in the changes of their PDV. First, younger cohorts
benefits from the change in the skill premium induced by immigration. Older cohorts suffer a loss in their
PDV with a pattern similar to the one exhibit by the low ability types. However, the drop in PDV in
this case is roughly 20% smaller. The intuition is that ability to adjust is crucial in this particular ability
group.
Immigration produces benefits for the high ability workers. The more they can adjust their investment,
the more they benefit. Therefore, age and benefits from immigration are negatively correlated for this
group. Note that an increase of 1% in the average skill premium (see Table 4) produces an increase of
the PDV of more than 4% for the younger cohorts presented in Table 5. This multiplicative effect comes
through the re-optimization of the human capital accumulation decisions. This effect is clearly observed
when we compare Table 5 with the same PDV calculated in the restricted counterfactual presented in
Table 6.
The results using the restricted counterfactual are qualitatively similar. Low ability workers suffer
losses in their PDV, high ability workers benefit from immigration, and middle ability workers can benefit
or lose from the change in the skill premium depending on their age at the time of the wave of immigration.
However, the most important difference is that the losses and the gains are smaller for this experiment.
This is consistent with the intuition that workers use the investment time dedicated to accumulation of
human capital to amplify (in the case of benefits) the effect of a change in the relative prices induced by
immigration.
Note that the change in skill premium for the restricted counterfactual is smaller than the change in
36Individuals with high ability to learn are the ones that enrolled in tertiary education. In particular, the highest ability
type always completes college in this model.
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skill premium observed in the standard experiment. Therefore, the losses for the low ability workers are
expected to be smaller in the restricted experiment. Moreover, Table 4 shows that the change in the skill
premium in the standard is more persistent than the one associated with the restricted counterfactual.
Thus, these patterns on the skill premium imply the bigger losses observed in the PDV for the standard
experiment.
Comparing these two tables allows me to disentangle the effect associated with the change in prices
and the effect associated with the reaction of workers after a change in prices. The average loss in PDV
across cohorts for the low ability types presented in Table 5, only the 15% corresponds to the change
in PDV displayed in Table 6. Therefore, the change in aggregate prices can only explain 15% of the
variation in PDV for the low ability workers. For the middle ability types, the restricted counterfactual
can explain 30% the variation in the PDV, but for the high ability workers, this explanatory power
reaches 75%. Overall, the restricted counterfactual explains 40% of the change in the PDV associated
with immigration.
Another way to asses how important is the ability to adjust is calculating how much the PDV calculated
using the restricted counterfactual can explain the PDV presented in Table 5 for different cohorts. For
the cohort of 1943, the restricted change in PDV corresponds to 76% of the change presented in the
unrestricted one. For the youngest cohort, only 5% of the variation can be explained by the restricted
counterfactual. This is consistent with the notion that younger cohorts adjust more to changes in the
relative prices.
Finally, calculating the average change in the PDV associated with the waves of immigration in 1980
and 1990 across all types and across the cohorts from 1943 to 1973, I find that immigration produces an
overall increase in the PDV of 0.4%. This gain in welfare is mainly driven by the gains of the highest
ability types that amplify the effect on the skill premium produced after an influx of immigrants arrives
to the economy. This overall change in PDV drops to a loss of -0.17% when only the ten lowest ability
types are considered.
Tables 7, and 8 present a similar decomposition, but now using educational attainment categories.
The findings from the previous tables are present in this new decomposition. High school workers suffer
a drop in their PDV due to immigration, college educated workers benefits from immigration, and only
the younger college dropouts can increase their PDV after the waves of immigration have affected the
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economy.
Note that the benefits for the college workers are higher than the benefits of the highest ability
types presented in Table 5. The intuition is that workers that before immigration were at the margin of
increase the time enrolled in tertiary education37 take advantage of the higher skill price and stay longer
in college, producing a significant increase in their earnings. Thus, changes at the extensive margin of
educational attainment produces effects on earnings significantly larger than the ones observed in the
restricted counterfactual.
7.3 Immigration and SBTC
Immigration has continually changed the U.S. labor market, as is shown in Table 3. Therefore, it is
difficult to identify its influence in the observed earnings distribution. Moreover, every day immigrants
arrive and join the labor market. This makes modeling immigration in the context of the model presented
above a complex task.
In order to deal with these difficulties, I present a number of different experiments to highlight im-
portant aspects of the immigration process, how it affects the labor market, and the significance of the
problem of measuring immigration38.
First, I show in appendix B that without SBTC, immigration is not able to produce enough variation
in the earnings distribution to match the U.S. data. This result is consistent with Heckman et al. (1998),
where a 25% increase in the low-skilled workers it is not enough to replicate the movements in the wage
distribution. Therefore, SBTC must also be included in the model. However, calibrating SBTC requires
the use of data from 1964 to 2005, a period during which the rate of immigration was increasing and
consequently affecting the moments used for the calibration procedure.
Second, I explore the differences between one experiment where I add immigrants to the labor market
and another where I subtract them from the labor market. In the first, immigration affects the economy
through the incorporation of workers into the labor force and through the change in the composition
of human capital and raw labor. The weakness of this experiment is that the data used for the cali-
37The parameter κ plays a crucial role in this decision. Remember that individuals can be enrolled in tertiary education,
or on the job learning with investment time between 0 and κ.
38An alternative way to think about this issue is to consider that the supply of workers is measured with error. If that is
the case, I show that the calibration and the mechanism presented in this paper, are robust to small amounts of measurement
error.
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bration already include the effects of immigration on prices. The second experiment takes this problem
into account, and thus the counterfactual experiment corresponds to a study of the economy without
immigrants. However, the second experiment has a different but related weakness. The drawback of the
second experiment is that the calibrated SBTC used in the model economy without immigration is biased,
because it has been obtained from data from a world with immigration.
Both experiments produce qualitatively similar results. Therefore I conclude that the results using
the first experiment type, that is, immigration as an addition to the labor force, highlight the feed back
effect of the re-optimization in human capital accumulation decisions on prices, when immigrants arrive
to the economy, and change the skill premium. Appendix C presents the tables of the key results when
immigration is modeled as a subtraction of workers from the labor market.
The ideal experiment consists on annually adding immigrants to the economy, and at the same time
calibrate the parameter associated with SBTC. However, this experiment is unfeasible considering that
only decennial data is available39. It would be necessary make assumptions about the annual pattern of
immigration, which can contaminate the results of the calibration procedure. Equation (4) shows that
changes in the labor supply and SBTC have similar effects on the aggregate prices PHt and P
L
t . Therefore,
assumptions regarding the pattern of immigration likely will affect the calibration of the SBTC parameters.
For these reasons, I only use the data available, and the experiments described previously, to calibrate
the growth rate of SBTC. Note that when immigration is introduced yearly, as presented in appendix D,
SBTC is the main force behind the evolution of the earning distribution, because in this case the size of
the inflow of immigrants is not enough to produce the variations on skill premium that we observe in the
data.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of immigration on both native
wages and the human capital accumulation decision. This model has a number of features that allows
me to study the direct effect of immigration on the relative price of human capital and the indirect effect
through changes in the human capital accumulation decisions of workers. Some of these features include
heterogeneity in the ability to learn, overlapping generations, and a CES production function with skill
39Only since the mid 1990s the March CPS contains detailed information about immigration status
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biased technical change.
In this economy, workers are heterogeneous in their ability to accumulate human capital due to
variation in their ability to learn. This feature is crucial when studying the impact of immigration.
On one hand, immigration increases the skill premium and this effect is amplified in individuals of high
ability. In contrast, low ability workers try to attenuate the adverse effects of immigration in their relative
earnings by decreasing human capital investment in order to increase observed earnings.
The significant amount of heterogeneity in this model allows me to decompose the effect of immigration
across age and ability types. Moreover, using a series of counterfactual experiments, I separately analyze
the effect of immigration on prices, and on human capital accumulation for a number of different age and
ability categories.
I find that older workers were moderately affected by immigration. The relatively large change in
the present discounted value of younger workers was associated with the introduction of more significant
changes in their human capital accumulation paths. For the younger workers, only 5% of the variation
of the present discounted value of earnings was attributable to the change in relative prices produced by
immigration.
Low skilled workers suffered losses in their present discounted value. Only 15% of these losses were
associated with the change in prices, and the remaining losses corresponded to their difficulty in adjusting
to the change in relative prices.
Finally, I find that more than 60% of the variation in the present discounted value of earnings came
from changes in human capital accumulation decisions. Moreover, changes in educational attainment
could produce benefits of more than 6% in the present discounted value. The overall effect of immigration
on the present discounted value is 0.4%. However, immigration produces a 0.17% drop in the welfare of
low skilled workers.
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Table 3: Stock and flow of Immigration in the U.S.
Percentage of U.S. population Percentage of U.S. population
year foreign-born arriving during previous decade
1950 6.9 0.7
1960 5.4 1.5
1970 4.7 1.7
1980 6.2 2.7
1990 7.9 3.0
2000 10 3.0
a Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table 5: Impact of immigration in terms of % change in PDV.
Ability types.
Immigration Experiments
Wave 1980 Wave 1990 Waves 1980 and 1990
Low Ability types (1-3)
Cohort 1943 -0.042 -0.020 -0.082
Cohort 1953 -0.073 -0.036 -0.127
Cohort 1963 -0.124 -0.067 -0.226
Cohort 1973 -0.10 -0.126 -0.308
Medium Ability types (11-14)
Cohort 1943 -0.028 -0.014 -0.012
Cohort 1953 -0.062 -0.028 -0.096
Cohort 1963 -0.102 -0.048 -0.201
Cohort 1973 0.007 0.008 0.012
High Ability types (17-20)
Cohort 1943 0.070 0.033 0.111
Cohort 1953 0.093 0.059 0.274
Cohort 1963 2.415 0.577 2.743
Cohort 1973 4.718 4.905 5.039
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Table 6: Impact of immigration in terms of % change in PDV.
Restricted Counterfactual. Ability types.
Immigration Experiments
Wave 1980 Wave 1990 Waves 1980 and 1990
Low Ability types (1-3)
Cohort 1943 -0.016 -0.009 -0.030
Cohort 1953 -0.008 -0.003 -0.033
Cohort 1963 -0.002 -0.001 -0.043
Cohort 1973 -0.001 -0.001 -0.020
Medium Ability types (11-14)
Cohort 1943 -0.005 -0.003 -0.012
Cohort 1953 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011
Cohort 1963 -0.001 -0.000 -0.022
Cohort 1973 0.115 0.076 0.034
High Ability types (17-20)
Cohort 1943 0.097 0.052 0.149
Cohort 1953 0.131 0.101 0.218
Cohort 1963 0.132 0.217 0.286
Cohort 1973 0.284 0.401 0.440
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Table 7: Impact of immigration in terms of % change in PDV.
Educational attainment.
Immigration Experiments
Wave 1980 Wave 1990 Waves 1980 and 1990
High School
Cohort 1943 -0.040 -0.019 -0.090
Cohort 1953 -0.071 -0.035 -0.121
Cohort 1963 -0.121 -0.064 -0.220
Cohort 1973 -0.087 -0.106 -0.293
College Dropouts
Cohort 1943 -0.026 -0.012 -0.015
Cohort 1953 -0.061 -0.027 -0.089
Cohort 1963 -0.094 -0.043 -0.195
Cohort 1973 0.304 0.301 0.012
College
Cohort 1943 0.045 0.022 0.055
Cohort 1953 0.033 0.033 0.149
Cohort 1963 1.631 0.397 1.749
Cohort 1973 7.343 7.656 6.973
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Table 8: Impact of immigration in terms of % change in PDV.
Restricted Counterfactual. Educational attainment.
Immigration Experiments
Wave 1980 Wave 1990 Waves 1980 and 1990
High School
Cohort 1943 -0.014 -0.008 -0.027
Cohort 1953 -0.006 -0.004 -0.030
Cohort 1963 -0.002 -0.002 -0.039
Cohort 1973 -0.001 -0.001 -0.023
College Dropouts
Cohort 1943 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008
Cohort 1953 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007
Cohort 1963 -0.001 -0.000 -0.018
Cohort 1973 0.116 0.078 0.037
College
Cohort 1943 0.065 0.035 0.100
Cohort 1953 0.093 0.075 0.152
Cohort 1963 0.091 0.157 0.189
Cohort 1973 0.233 0.298 0.308
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A Calibrating Immigrants’ Ability Distribution
One of the challenge of the calibration procedure is to calibrate the immigrants’ distribution of ability. In
order to do so, I use information from the Census data for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000 to obtain three
cross sections of the immigrants’ earnings distribution.
Note that the information about immigrants’ educational attainment is available, but this data may
not be comparable with the educational system in the U.S. Moreover, some of countries exhibit constraints
in the supply of higher education, which can further contaminate this information.
Therefore, it is necessary to use a different approach to calibrate the immigrants’ ability distribution.
The model predicts that age-earnings profile differ according to ability level. High ability individuals
present steeper profiles, once they are out of school. Thus, the growth rate of earnings, for different ages,
is informative of the underlying ability parameter.
The cross sections allows me to calculate the growth rate of log-earnings for 5 different age categories40.
Moreover, I calculate the growth rate for each decile on each age category. For example: first, I obtain
40I split the age range using 10 years intervals.
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the first decile of the log earnings distribution of workers with ages between 18 and 27 years old in the
year 1980; second, I obtain the first decile of the log earnings distribution of workers with ages between
28 and 37 years old in the year 1990; then, I calculate the growth rate of the first decile for immigrants
born between 1957 and 1966.
Calculating the growth rate of all of these moments allows me to study different pieces of the age-
earnings profiles. In particular, I obtain information on the steepness and dispersion of the earnings profile
for different ages and for workers with potentially different abilities. Using the simulated data, I calibrate
the immigrants’ ability distribution to match the moments calculated above. Note that, I only need to
calibrate the fraction of each ability type.
B Immigration Explaining the Dynamics of the U.S. Earning Distri-
bution
Equation (4 shows that immigration and SBTC affect the aggregate prices in similar ways. Therefore, it
is hard to disentangle how much of the change in the dispersion of the earnings distribution is attributable
to inflows of immigrants, and how much is associated with the dynamics of the SBTC.
Heckman et al. (1998) found that immigration is unable to produce enough variation in the skill price
to explain the dynamics of the earnings distribution. They noted that a 25% increase in the supply of
low skilled workers is not enough to create the change observed in the data. These results are consistent
with the findings presented in Table 4. Immigration only produces small changes in the skill premium.
Figure 8 presents the changes in the 90/10 log earnings differential from 1980 to 2000, for two different
sets of data. The first is the March CPS, and the second is from a counterfactual economy without
SBTC, but with the waves of immigration described in section 6. It is easy to observe that the amount of
dispersion produced solely by immigration accounts for half of the growth in earnings inequality observed
in the data. In conclusion, SBTC must be included in the model to account for some of the increase in
the dispersion observed in the earnings distribution.
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Figure 8: 90/10 overall inequality. Counterfactual.
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C Subtracting Immigration from the Economy
In section 2.7.4, I discuss the difficulty of calibrating the parameters associated with SBTC. The data from
the March CPS already contains information affected by immigration. According to our model, individuals
change their human capital accumulation decisions after immigration changes the labor supply. Therefore,
earnings information from the March CPS captures the adjusted earning profile of the individuals living
in the economy.
In order to asses how important is the bias associated with this issue, I simulate an alternative
counterfactual. The experiment consists in subtract immigration from the economy, instead of adding
immigrants to the labor force. For brevity, I present only the results associated with the change in the
PDV, and the skill premium when immigrants arrive in 1980 and 1990. Tables 9 and 10 displays the
results for this alternative counterfactual.
Note that the results are smaller than the one presented in tables 4 and 5. In this alternative counter-
factual, immigration and SBTC cause opposite effects. On one hand, SBTC increases the skill premium,
and consequently the earnings of high ability workers. On the other hand, less immigration increases the
demand for low ability workers, decreasing the skill premium and increasing the PDV of those workers.
However, qualitatively the results are the same. High ability workers benefit from immigration, meanwhile
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Table 9: Impact of Immigration on the Skill Premium. Counterfactual
Waves 1980 and 1990
Average change in skill premium (%)1980-1990 0.61
Average change in skill premium (%)1900-2000 1.95
Average change in skill premium (%)1990-2005 1.43
Average change in skill premium (%)1980-2005 1.07
low ability, and older workers are not able to adjust enough to counter the effect of immigration.
D Yearly Waves of Immigration
Throughout the paper I have assumed that immigration is unexpected and arrives only in 1980, 1990 and
2000. However, the actual process of immigration occurs on a yearly basis.
Table 11 presents the variation in the PDV of lifetime earnings when immigration is introduced every
year, according to the data from the Census. I calculate the change in PDV under three possible scenarios.
First, natives never expect immigration. They always assume that is one time shock, adjust their human
capital accumulation decision, but they do not forecast any future immigration. They do this adjustment
every year. This experiment allows me to compare with the decennial shock presented in the main body
of the paper. In these cases, immigration is unexpected.
The second and third scenarios present a more realistic adjustment for the natives. The results
associated with Rational I, correspond to the case in which natives forecast future immigration, using the
current one. That is, they assume that the distribution of immigrants that they will receive the following
year is the same distribution currently observed.
Finally, the column Rational II presents the variation on the PDV when natives use past information
to produce a trend of immigration influx. They update this trend when new information arrives, using a
bayesian rule.
As expected, the results are quantitatively smaller, but they preserve qualitatively the results presented
in the main body of the paper. Note that this results indicate the non-linearity in the natives response
to shocks of different size.
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Table 10: Impact of immigration in terms of %
change in PDV. Counterfactual. Ability types.
Waves 1980 and 1990
Low Ability types(1-3)
Cohort 1943 -0.019
Cohort 1953 -0.112
Cohort 1963 -0.189
Cohort 1973 -0.156
Medium Ability types (11-14)
Cohort 1943 -0.018
Cohort 1953 -0.086
Cohort 1963 -0.176
Cohort 1973 0.031
High Ability types (17-20)
Cohort 1943 0.108
Cohort 1953 0.178
Cohort 1963 2.934
Cohort 1973 5.888
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Table 11: Impact of immigration in terms of % change in PDV. Yearly Waves.
Ability types.
Immigration Experiments
Waves 1980 and 1990 Yearly waves Rational I Rational II
Low Ability types (1-3)
Cohort 1943 -0.082 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024
Cohort 1953 -0.127 -0.039 -0.039 -0.038
Cohort 1963 -0.226 -0.070 -0.070 -0.067
Cohort 1973 -0.308 -0.068 -0.067 -0.063
Medium Ability types (11-14)
Cohort 1943 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Cohort 1953 -0.096 -0.037 -0.038 -0.036
Cohort 1963 -0.201 -0.064 -0.067 -0.066
Cohort 1973 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.016
High Ability types (17-20)
Cohort 1943 0.111 0.060 0.061 0.062
Cohort 1953 0.274 0.032 0.009 0.009
Cohort 1963 2.743 0.764 0.643 0.638
Cohort 1973 5.039 2.163 1.756 1.420
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